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Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of optimal design of a jurisdiction structure from
the view point of a welfarist social planner when households with identical utility func-
tions for non-rival public good and private consumption have private information about
their contributive capacities. It shows that the superiority of a centralized provision
of a non-rival public good over a federal one does not always hold. Specically, when
di¤erences in households contributive capacities are large, it is better to provide the
public good in several distinct jurisdictions rather than to pool these jurisdictions into
a single one. In the specic case where households have logarithmic utilities, the pa-
per provides a complete characterization of the optimal jurisdiction structure in the
two-type case.
Cest pour unir les avantages divers qui résultent de la grandeur et de la petitesse
des nations que le fédératif a été créé." (Alexis de Toqueville)
1 Introduction
In many countries, one nds signicant regional variation in the bundles of public goods and
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taxes available to households. This is clearly the case in federal countries such as Canada
and United States where the provinces and the states have the power to decide the provision
of specic public goods (for instance education) and to collect taxes. But this phenomenon
is also observed in unitary" countries such as France or the UK where cities have specic
powers in terms of public good production (for instance the nancing of primary school in-
frastructure) and taxation (local taxes). This heterogeneity in the package of public goods
and taxes o¤ered to the citizens of a same country is sometimes perceived as the source
of unacceptable inequalities. As a result, it is not uncommon to observe attempts made by
central authorities to correct these inequalities by means of various cross-jurisdictions equal-
ization payments schemes. But one may wonder why central authorities do not push further
this equalizing logic by carrying themselves the task of providing their citizens with the same
package of public goods and taxes instead of maintaining these distinct jurisdictions. As the
recent North American episodes of city mergers in large agglomerations (Boston, Montreal,
Toronto) illustrate, this centralizing solution is sometimes adopted. Yet, the decision to
merge many cities into one large agglomeration that is responsible for providing the same
public goods and taxes package to all its inhabitants has been received with great skepticism
by many. Is this skepticism justied? Is there some argument that can justify cross-citizens
heterogeneity in public goods and taxes packages from a normative standpoint or, to put it
bluntly, federalism? These are the questions that are addressed in this paper.
These questions are not new. They were underlying the above quote from Alexis de
Toqueville and were framed by Wallace Oates (1972) as follows:
In the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a [local public]
good and of interjurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at
least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-e¢ cient levels of consumption are
provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is
maintained."1
In this paper, we formulate in a precise model Oatess and Toquevilles intuition that
a federal provision of public goods in separated jurisdictions can be normatively better
than a centralized provision in the absence of cost-saving from the centralized provision".
Specically, we provide a model in which even when the cost-saving case in favour of a
centralized provision of a public good is maximal - namely when the public good is non-rival
- it can be optimal to organize its provision in a federal system when the relevant information
needed to provide the public good is not available to the social planner.
The formal architecture of the model is as follows. There is a collection of households who
have the same preferences for one public good and one private good. Each household has
an exogenous pecuniary wealth that is unobserved by the central government. The public
good can be provided locally in distinct jurisdictions organized through a federal system
1A nice survey of the literature on scal federalism is provided by Oates (1999).
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or centrally in one grand jurisdiction. It either case, public good provision is nanced by
taxes in such a way that the budget is balanced within the federation (but not necessarily
within a given jurisdiction). The central government chooses the bundles of local public
good provision and tax payment - one such a bundle for every jurisdiction - in such a way as
to provide incentive for households to reveal their willingness to pay for the public good by
their locational choice. As in Tiebout (1956), therefore, households vote with their feet(see
also Wildasin (1987)). More specically, the government chooses bundles of public goods
and taxes that maximize a social welfare function under two constraints: 1) a preference
revelation constraint (each household must prefer the combination assigned to it by the
government to any other) and 2) a budget constraint (the taxes raised in all jurisdictions
must be su¢ cient to nance public goods that are locally provided in all of them).
From a formal point of view, this problem is somewhat reminiscent of the classical Mirrlees
optimal income taxation problem (see for instance Mirrlees (1971), Mirrlees (1976), Mirrlees
(1986)) with leisure being replaced by a public good. Yet this replacingsignicantly mod-
ies the nature of the problem. In the Mirrlees setting, since leisure is a purely private good
- the fact that Bob has 24 hours of leisure per day cannot be used to improve Marys utility
- there is no intrinsic benet for the social planner to pool together households with di¤erent
characteristics. Because of this, Mirrleesian optimal income tax schedules typically involve
signicant separation of workers with di¤erent characteristics in order to provide workers
with the proper incentives to reveal their type. With public goods, the central planner does
benet from pooling together individuals with di¤erent characteristics since a given quantity
of a non-rival public good may benet many individuals at no extra cost. Because of this,
the central planner must make a trade-o¤ between the benet of pooling individuals in order
to reduce the cost of public good provision and the welfare cost associated to the provision
of the same package of public good and taxation to heterogeneous households. The nature
of this trade-o¤ determines the optimal level of heterogeneity in public good and taxation
packages for a community. It also determines the choice between a centralized provision of
the public good within a single grand" jurisdiction or its provision within separated juris-
dictions between which the federal government organizes optimal equalization transfers (see
e.g.; Boadway and Flatters (1982), Buchanan (1950), Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszcowski
(1974) or Gravel and Poitevin (2006)).
While a few models have examined scal federalism issues under asymmetric information
in the literature, including those of Aronsson and Blomquist (2008), Bordignon, Manasse,
and Tabellini (2001), Breuillé and Gary-Bobo (2007), Cornes and Silva (2000) and Cornes
and Silva (2002), none that we are aware of have considered the problem of choosing the
appropriate jurisdiction structure  federal or centralized as it may be  for providing a
non-rival public good.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the notation
and examine in its full generality the problem of the optimal choice of a jurisdiction structure
under asymmetric information. In section 3, we examine the problem in the (much) more
specic setting where there are only two types of households, and where these households
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have additively separable and symmetric preferences over the two goods. We provide a com-
plete characterization of the solution of the problem in the important case where the social
planner is utilitarian and would like, in the federal solution, to transfer wealth from the rich
jurisdiction to the poor one. As shown in Gravel and Poitevin (2006), this implies indeed
that the symmetric and additively separable utility function that represents the households
preference is in fact logarithmic with respect to both goods. Section 4 provides some conclu-
sions.
2 The general structure of the problem
2.1 Notation
There are n  2 households taken from a nite set N . Household i has a monetary wealth
wi 2 R+ and consumes a public good (z) and a private good (x). Households are ordered by
their wealth in such a way that wi  wi+1 for i = 1; :::; n 1. The public good is non-rival in
consumption but is excludable" in the sense that its consumption may be made contingent
upon the fact of belonging to a specic jurisdiction. Specically, exclusion can be made by
partitioning the set N of households into pairwise disjoint sets Nj for j = 1; :::; l for some
number l 2 f1; :::; ng such that Slj=1 Nj = N . Any set Nj of this partition is interpreted as a
jurisdiction and the collection of l-such sets fNjglj=1 is interpreted as a jurisdiction structure.
The unique jurisdiction structure that is obtained if l = 1 is the grand or centralized 
jurisdiction structure in which all households are pooled into one single jurisdiction. All other
jurisdiction structures obtained for l > 1 are referred to as federal". An extreme form of
federalism is the jurisdiction structure associated to the case where l = n (each household
forms a jurisdiction on its own). An allocation of public and private goods for the jurisdiction
structure J = fNjglj=1 is dened as a list (z1; :::; zl;x1; :::; xn) 2 Rl+n+ with the interpretation
that zj is the consumption of public good in jurisdiction j (for j 2 f1; :::; lg) and xi is the
consumption of private good by household i (for i 2 N). An allocation of public and private
goods (z1; :::; zl;x1; :::; xn) for the jurisdiction structure J = fNjglj=1 is feasible for that
jurisdiction structure if it veries the federation budget constraint:2
(1)
X
j2f1;:::;lg
zj +
X
i2N
xi 
X
i2N
wi:
2We assume that the production of z units of the public good requires z units of the private good. This
assumption is without loss of generality in our two goods model.
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If (z1; :::; zl;x1; :::; xn) is an allocation of public and private goods that is feasible for the
jurisdiction structure J = fNjglj=1, we denote by Ti = wi   xi the tax paid by household i.
An equivalent reformulation of the budget constraint is of course that:X
j2f1;:::;lg
zj 
X
i2N
Ti
(taxes collected must be su¢ cient to nance the quantities of the public good provided to
the citizens).
Households convert alternative combinations of private and public goods into utility by
the same continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and concave utility function U :
R2+ ! R (with image u). The utility function is also assumed to be super-modular in the
sense of satisfying Uxz(z; x)  0. The second part of the paper also assumes, in addition
to the above properties, that U is additively separable so that it can be written, for every
bundle (z; x) 2 R2+, as:
U(z; x) = f(z) + h(x);
for some twice continuously di¤erentiable increasing and concave real-valued functions f
and h having both R+ as domain. For further use, we denote by V (V : R3++ ! R) the
households indirect utility function dened as usual by:
(2) V (pz; px; R) = max
z;x
U(z; x) subject to pzz + pxx  R:
We also denote by zM(pz; px; R) and xM(pz; px; R) the (Marshallian) demands for public
good and private consumption (respectively) when the prices for these two goods are pz and
px and when the wealth of the household is R. These Marshallian demands are dened, as
usual, by the solution of program (2). Given the assumptions imposed on U , it can be seen
easily that Marshallian demands and indirect utility are di¤erentiable functions of prices and
wealth that are both decreasing with respect to prices and increasing with respect to wealth
(the two goods are normal if the households preferences are represented by a super-modular
utility function). We denote by U the class of all direct utility functions that satisfy all
these properties and by UA the subset of U consisting of those functions that are additively
separable.
The criterion used by the social planner to compare alternative allocations of private
and public goods from a social viewpoint is represented by a social evaluation function
S : R2n+ ! R (with the interpretation that S(x1; z1; :::; xn; zn)  S(x01; z01; :::; x0n; z0n) if and
only if (x1; z1; :::; xn; zn) is socially better than (x01; z
0
1; :::; x
0
n; z
0
n)). We specically assume that
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the social criterion is welfarist and results from the aggregation of the households utilities
by a Pareto-inclusive Schur-concave social welfare function so that, for every allocation
(x1; z1; :::; xn; zn) 2 R2n+ , one can write S(x1; z1; :::; xn; zn) = W (U(x1; z1); :::; U(xn; zn)) for
some increasing and Schur-concave function W : Rn ! R. Most of the analysis will actually
be conducted with the utilitarian objective (where W (u1; :::; u1) = u1 + :::+ un for every list
(u1; :::; un) of utility levels).
2.2 The choice of a jurisdiction structure under public information
As is well-known from basic public economics, if households utilities and wealth are public
information, the problem solved by the social planner is easy. Since the public good is
non-rival in consumption, it is a waste to have di¤erent individuals consuming di¤erent
quantities of the public good. For if (z1; :::; zl;x1; :::; xn) is a feasible allocation of private and
public goods for a jurisdiction structure fNjglj=1 with l > 1, one can improve everyones
utility by providing everyone with z = maxh2f1;:::;lg zh units of the public good and xi +
(
P
j2f1;:::;lg zj   z)=n units of the private good. For this reason, the only jurisdiction structure
that can be chosen by a Pareto sensitive social planner in a rst-best environment is the grand
jurisdiction structure associated to l = 1. In a rst-best world, there is no dispute as to the
superiority of a central provision of a non-rival public good over a federal one. There is, of
course, a (distributive) need to have di¤erent households paying di¤erent taxes for the public
good. More specically, the welfarist social planner would choose, in the grand jurisdiction
structure, a distribution of taxes that solves:
(3) max
(T1;:::;Tn)
W (U(
X
i2N
Ti; w1   T1); :::; U(
X
i2N
Ti; wn   Tn; )):
Such a distribution of taxes call it (T 1 ; :::; T

n) would satisfy the well-known Samuelsons
condition that the sum of the households marginal rates of substitution between the private
and the public goods equal 1. It is clear here that if W is Schur-concave, the central gov-
ernment would solve problem (3) by equalizing utility levels, an equalization which can only
be achieved, given the same level of public good provided to all, by equalizing private con-
sumptions. In this ideal rst-best world, public and private good consumptions are perfectly
equalized, and taxation is individualized by means of personalized Lindahl pricing.
2.3 The choice of a jurisdiction structure under private information
If the information on householdscharacteristics is private, the social planner is no longer
able to levy di¤erent taxes on households who consume the same quantity of the public
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good because these households are indistinguishable from its point of view. The social planner
could, however, provide di¤erent households with di¤erent packages of taxes and public good
levels based on, say, their place of residence, in order to make them reveal their willingness
to pay. Households would then vote with their feet" and choose to live at the place of
residence o¤ering them their favorite package of public spending and taxes, thus revealing
their type" to the social planner. Of course, separating households in di¤erent jurisdictions
is costly because it requires the use of (much) more resources to provide di¤erent levels of the
public good in di¤erent jurisdictions than what would be needed under a single jurisdiction
with a single level of the non-rival public good for all households.
We consider herein the case where the private information concerns the households
wealth  the only variable that di¤ers across households  and where the social planner
is utilitarian. While the wealth of a particular household is unknown to the social planner,
we assume that the cumulative density of the wealth within the population (e.g., the num-
ber of households who have a wealth no greater than any real number) is known. With this
knowledge, the planner chooses a jurisdiction structure fNjglj=1 (for some l 2 f1; :::; ng) and
a feasible allocation of the private and the public good for that structure that maximizes its
social objective, subject to the constraint that every household prefers the package of public
good and tax in the jurisdiction to which it is assigned to any other. This problem is, in its
full generality, complex, and proceeds in two steps.
In the rst step, for a given jurisdiction structure fNjglj=1 for some l 2 f1; :::; ng, the
social planner solves the program:
(4) max
z1;T1;:::;zl;Tl
lX
j=1
X
i2Nj
U(zj; wi   Tj; )
subject to the budget constraint:
(5)
lX
j=1
zj 
lX
j=1
#NjTj
and, for every j 2 f1; :::; lg, and every i 2 Nj, the l incentive-compatibility constraints:
(6) U(zj; wi   Tj)  U(zj0 ; wi   Tj0) for all j0 2 f1; :::; lg:
Let 	(fNjglj=1) denote the value of the objective function of the social planner at the
solution of program (4) under the constraints (5) and (6). The second step of the central plan-
ners problem consists in choosing the jurisdiction structure fNjglj=1 for some l 2 f1; :::; ng
that maximizes the value of 	(fNjglj=1). This second step is clearly a discrete problem since
there is only a nite number of di¤erent possible partitions of N into jurisdiction structures.
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A natural starting point for studying program (4) is to consider the centralized juris-
diction structure. Studying program (4) under the centralized jurisdiction structure is easy
because there are no incentive constraints (6) to worry about. In that case program (4)
writes (after substituting the budget constraint (5) satised at equality into the objective
function):
(7) 	(N) = max
T2[0;wn]
X
i2N
U(nT;wi   T ):
The necessary (and su¢ cient by concavity of U) rst-order condition for an interior solution
T  of this program can be written as:
(8) n
U

z
U

x
= 1;
where U

k = [
P
i2N Uk(nT
; wi T )]=n for k = z; x is the average marginal utility of good k at
the optimal choice. This condition looks somewhat like a Samuelson condition. It states that
the optimal allocation of public good in the case where everybody is constrained to pay the
same tax (because the government cannot distinguish between individuals) equalizes a sum
of householdsmarginal rate of substitution between private and public goods to the marginal
rate of transformation of 1. Yet the marginal rates of substitution involved in equation (8) are
not the householdsones but are, instead, those of an abstract representative individual"
whose marginal rate of substitution is the ratio of the average marginal utility of the public
good over the average marginal utility of the private good. Because of this, the centralized
second-best solution is a priori di¤erent from the one associated to rst-best optimality.
There is however an obvious case where condition (8) coincides with the standard Samuel-
son condition and where, as a result, 	(N) is the maximal sum of individual utilities that
would obtain in the rst-best world where the government had all the relevant information.
This case is when the householdsutility function is quasi-linear (in the private good) so
that it writes, for every z and x, as U(z; x) = f(z) + x for some increasing and concave
function f . Indeed with quasi-linear utility, condition (8) writes:
(9) n
@f(nT )
@z
= 1;
which is nothing else than the Samuelsons condition associated with quasi-linear utility.
Hence, with quasi-linear utility, it is possible to achieve a rst-best allocation of private and
public goods by pooling everybody in the same jurisdiction. Because of this, in the quasi-
linear case, one has 	(N)  	(fNjglj=1) for every jurisdiction structure fNjglj=1 that the
central planner could consider. In a quasi-linear world, it would never be optimal to create
more than one jurisdiction for providing a non-rival public good.
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In the following example, developed further in the second part of the paper, we show that
this conclusion is highly dependent upon the quasi-linear assumption. If this assumption is
relaxed, a federal jurisdiction structure can be better than the centralized one from a social
welfare point of view.
Example 1 There are 100 households, 90 of which are rich" - and have a wealth of 10
- and 10 of them are poor" (and have a wealth of 1). Their common utility function is
U(z; x) = ln z + lnx. The social planner uses a utilitarian social welfare function. If the
central planner chooses the centralized jurisdiction structure, it solves
max
T2[0;1]
100  ln(100T ) + 90  ln(10  T ) + 10  ln(1  T ):
The necessary FOC for this program is:
100
T 
  90
10  T   
10
1  T  = 0
or, equivalently:
T  = 0:90108:
This tax rate yields a production of 90:108 units of public good.
The social planner can do better than this by considering the jurisdiction structure where
the 90 rich households belong to one jurisdiction with tax and public good provision TR
and zR, and the poor in another with tax TP and public good zP . For instance, the social
planner could select zR = 409:5, TR = 5:45, zP = 45:5 and TP =  3:55 (the poor receive
a subsidy!!). Such an allocation is feasible for the federal jurisdiction structure because the
budget constraint is satised, that is, zR + zP = 409:5 + 45:5 = 455 = nRTR + nPTp =
90 5:45  10 3:55 = 455. Moreover, any rich household prefers the bundle of public and
private good (409:5; 4:55) obtained in the rich jurisdiction of the federation to the bundle
(90:108; 9:09892) received with the central solution (indeed ln 409:5 + ln 4:55 ' 7:5301 >
6:7092 ' ln 90:108 + ln 9:09892). Similarly, a poor household prefers its package of taxes and
public good provision in the federal solution to that in the centralized one because ln 45:5 +
ln 4:55 ' 5:3328 > 2:187 6 ' ln 90:108 + ln 0:09892. Hence the federal jurisdiction structure
is Pareto superior to the centralized one. Finally, it can be checked that the federal structure
is viable" in the sense that each of the two categories of households prefers its jurisdiction
to that of the other. This is clear for the poor who could not even pay the tax of 5:45 that
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is charged in the rich jurisdiction. But that is also true for the rich who would get, were it
to move to the poor jurisdiction, a utility of U(zP ; 10   TP ) = ln 45:5 + ln 13:55 ' 6:4241,
which is smaller than the utility of 7:5301 obtained in its own jurisdiction.
The question is thus: under which conditions is a centralized jurisdiction structure op-
timal? How can we characterize optimal jurisdiction structures in general contexts? These
questions are di¢ cult to answer in general. For one thing, the two-step program described
above is di¢ cult to solve because if the number of households with di¤erent wealth levels is
large, then so is the number of jurisdiction structures that are to be compared.
Be it as it may, studying federal jurisdiction structure requires that constraints (6) be
handled properly. It is easy to see that the preference of a household with wealth wi in
the space of all possible public good and tax packages is represented by the utility function
wi : R+  R ! R dened by wi(z; T ) = U(z; wi   T ). These preferences are convex,
increasing in z and decreasing in T . Moreover, if the public good is normal (which is the
case here thanks to the super-modularity assumption), these preferences satisfy the single-
crossing property that MRS
w1
(z; T ) > MRS
w2
(z; T ) at every (z; T ) where, for i = 1; 2,
MRS
w1
(z; T ) is the slope, evaluated at (z; T ), of the indi¤erence curve of a wealth-wi
household. It is dened by:
MRS
wi (z; T ) =
@U(z; wi   T )=@z
@U(z; wi   T )=@x
:
Therefore, if the public good is normal, it is easy to show that MRS
wi (z; T ) is increasing
with respect to wi everywhere.
The indi¤erence curves of two households with di¤erent wealth levels passing through
some point c 2 R+  R are represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Two indi¤erence curves in the (T; z) space.
This standard single-crossing property simplies somehow program (4). Among other
things, it guarantees that all jurisdictions of a given federation that satisfy incentive con-
straints (6) will be consecutive (e.g., see Greenberg (1983)) and, therefore, be such that for
any two jurisdictions with distinct per capita wealth, the richest household of the poorer
jurisdiction is weakly poorer than the poorest household of the richer one. Yet, signicant
as it is, this simplication leaves the analysis of program (4) in its full generality still quite
di¢ cult. One of the di¢ culty lies in handling the incentive constraints that may or may
not be binding. Because of this complexity, we focus attention herein on the (much) simpler
problem of characterizing the optimal jurisdiction structure when there are only two types
of households.
3 The choice of a jurisdiction structure with two types of households
We assume accordingly that the n households can be split in two types: n1 households of type
1 (the "rich" with wealth w1) and n2 households of type 2 (the "poor" with wealth w2). In this
setting the choice of the optimal jurisdiction structure made by the social planner amounts
to comparing the value of its objective function in the centralized jurisdiction structure with
that in the situation where the households are split into two jurisdictions: one inhabited by
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the poor, and the other by the rich. It is clear that, beside this segregated federation in which
all type-1 households live in a jurisdiction and all type-2 households live in another, there are
no partition of the set of households into (more than one) disjoint subsets that can maximize
a Pareto-inclusive objective while satisfying the incentive compatibility constraints.3 We
denote by (N1; N2) the federal jurisdiction structure in which the rich and the poor live
in two distinct jurisdictions and by N the centralized jurisdiction structure in which all
households live in the same jurisdiction.
3.1 The two-type case with general utility functions
Consider rst the centralized jurisdiction structure. Let us examine the utility possibility set
of this structure. The Pareto frontier of this set is easy to characterize. It is a curve lying
between two points: One where each poor gets its ideal utility" associated to its favorite
tax and the rich gets the utility associated with the poors favorite tax and the other extreme
situation where the rich gets its ideal utility and the poor gets the utility level associated to
the fact of paying the most preferred tax of the rich.
The favorite tax T 2 of the poor is the solution of the program:
max
T2[0;w2]
U(nT;w2   T ):
It is immediate to see that this favorite tax is given by T 2 = z
M(1=n; 1; w2)=n. The poors
favorite tax is therefore nothing else than the expenditure (expressed in units of the private
good) that the poor would like to devote to the public good if the price of this public good
was 1=n). Hence the poors ideal utility level is V (1=n; 1; w2).
For the rich, things are a bit di¤erent because of the fact that, when deciding its favorite
tax, it must take into account the ability to pay of the poor. The most preferred tax of the
rich T 1 is, in e¤ect, the solution to the program:
max
T2[0;w2]
U(nT;w1   T ):
There are two cases:
3Suppose there are at least two jurisdictions with each of them inhabited by the two types of households.
Denote by (zj ; Tj) the package of public good and tax prevailing in jurisdiction j (for j = 1; 2). The constraints
(6) of program (4) imply that:
U(z1; wi   T1) = U(z2; wi   T2)
for i = 1; 2. By the single crossing property, this can only hold if (z1; T1) = (z2; T2). But if this is the case,
then it is better for the social planner to merge the two jurisdictions into one, and to nance the (common)
public good quantity by means of a lower tax levied on a larger number of households.
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1. T 1 = w2 (the rich chooses to tax all the poors income) or
2. T 1 = z
M(1=n; 1; w1)=n (as for the poor, the most preferred tax of the rich is the expen-
diture that the rich would like to devote to the public good if it had the opportunity
to purchase it at the Lindahl price of 1=n.)
In short T 1 = min(z
M(1=n; 1; w1)=n; w2) and the richs ideal utility level (denoted U1SB1
with the subscript standing for the "second-best 1-jurisdiction") is dened by:
U1SB1 =
8<:V (1=n; 1; w1) if zM(1=n; 1; w1)=n  w2U(nw2; w1   w2) otherwise.
It is immediate to see that, if the public good is normal, T 1 > T

2 and that both
U1SB1 > U(z
M(1=n; 1; w2); w1   T 2 ) > V (1=n; 1; w2) > U(nT 1 ; w2   T 1 ):
Hence, the two extreme points (U(zM(1=n; 1; w2); w1 T 2 ); V (1=n; 1; w2)) and (U1SB1; U(nT 1 ; w2 
T 1 )) of the Pareto frontier will lie in the area where the utility of the rich is larger than
that of the poor. It will therefore be di¢ cult to be egalitarian in this second-best world
with one jurisdiction. Between its extreme points (U(zM(1=n; 1; w2); w1 T 2 ); V (1=n; 1; w2))
and (U1SB1; U(nT

1 ; w2   T 1 )), the Pareto frontier is dened by the function  : R! R
with (u1) = U(nT SB(u1); w2   T SB(u1)) where the function T SB : [U(zM(1=n; 1; w2); w1  
T 2 ); U
1
SB1] ! [0; T 1 ] is dened implicitly, for every u1 2 [U(zM(1=n; 1; w2); w1   T 2 ); U1SB1]
by:
U(nT SB(u1); w1   T SB(u1)) = u1:
It is easy to verify by usual implicit function arguments that the function  is decreasing
and concave on its domain.
This frontier is illustrated on Figure 2 in a situation where U1SB1 = V (1=n; 1; w1) (the
ideal tax of the rich is less than the poors wealth).
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U1
U2
U1 = U2
V(1/n,1,w2)
V(1/n,1,w1)
Pareto Frontier
U(nT2*,w1-T2*)
U(nT1*,w2-T1*)
Figure 2: utility possibility set of a unitary jurisdiction structure.
Notice that T 2 is the solution that would be selected by an extremely egalitarian leximin
or a maximin social planner.
We now turn to the federal jurisdiction structure (N1; N2) in which the central government
separates" the two types into two di¤erent jurisdictions by solving program (4) for that case.
A rst possibility that can arise is that none of the two IC constraints (6) of this program
binds. If this the case, one can solve program (4) by ignoring these constraints. This program,
studied for an arbitrary number of jurisdictions by Gravel and Poitevin (2006), describes how
a central planner would design optimal equalization payments in a federal system with an
immobile population. Let B(n1; n2; w1; w2) = f(z1; T1; z2; T2) 2 R4 : n1T1+n2T2  z1+z2 and
Ti  wi for i = 1; 2g denote the set of two-jurisdiction packages of public goods and taxes that
are feasible for a two-jurisdiction segregated federation notwithstanding the IC constraints.
It is easy to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let U be a utility function in U . Then (z1 ; T 1 ; z2 ; T 2 ) is Pareto-e¢ cient in the set
B(n1; n2; w1; w2) if and only if there exists si 2 [ wi;+1) satisfying zi = zM(1=ni; 1; wi+si )
and T i = wi   xM(1=ni; 1; wi + si ) for i = 1; 2, and n1s1 + n2s2 = 0.
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Proof. Suppose rst that there exists si 2 [ wi;+1) satisfying:
zi = z
M(1=ni; 1; wi + s

i ),
T i = wi   xM(1=ni; 1; wi + si )
for i = 1; 2 such that
n1s

1 + n2s

2 = 0:
Yet suppose that, contrary to the statement of the lemma, (z1 ; T

1 ; z

2 ; T

2 ) is not Pareto-
e¢ cient in B(n1; n2; w1; w2). This means that there exists some allocation (bz1; bT1; bz2; bT2) in
B(n1; n2; w1; w2) such that U(bzi; wi  bTi)  U(zi ; wi T i ) for i = 1; 2 with at least one strict
inequality. By standard revealed preference arguments, this implies that bzi=ni + (wi   bTi) 
zi =ni + (wi   T i ) = wi + si for i = 1; 2 with at least one strict inequality. Multiplying both
sides of each of these inequalities by ni and summing yields:
bz1   n1 bT1 + bz2   n2 bTi > n1s1 + n2s2
= 0:
But this contradicts the assumption that (bz1; bT1; bz2; bT2) is in B(n1; n2; w1; w2). Conversely,
assume that (z1 ; T

1 ; z

2 ; T

2 ) is Pareto-e¢ cient in the set B(n1; n2; w1; w2). Dene then s

i by
(10) si =
zi
ni
  T i
for i = 1; 2. Since (z1 ; T

1 ; z

2 ; T

2 ) is Pareto-e¢ cient in B(n1; n2; w1; w2), it satises n1T

1 +
n2T

2 = z

1 + z

2 so that:
n1s

1 + n2s

2 = z

1 + z

2   n1T 1   n2T 2 = 0
as required. Let us now show that zi = z
M(1=ni; 1; wi+s

i ) and T

i = wi xM(1=ni; 1; wi+si )
for i = 1; 2. Thanks to (10), it is clear that, for i = 1; 2, wi + si = z

i =ni + wi   T i
so that the bundle of public and private good (zi ; wi   T i ) satises the budget constraint
dened by setting the price of public good at 1=ni and the household wealth at wi + si (using
private good as the numéraire). Suppose to the contrary that, for household 1 (say, but
the argument works equally well for household 2 or for both types of households) one has
(z1 ; w1   T 1 ) 6= (zM(1=n1; 1; w1 + s1); xM(1=n1; 1; w1 + s1)). Since Marshallian demands are
functions of the public good prices and wealth, this means that there exists some bundle
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(bz1; bx1) satisfying w1 + s1 = bz1=n1 + bx1 such that U(bz1; bx1) > U(z1 ; w1  T 1 ). Dening bT1 bybT1 = w1   bx1, this means that:
n1w1 + n1s

1 + n2w2 + n2s

2 = bz1 + n1(w1   bT1) + z2 + n2(w2   T 2 ):
Because n1s1 + n2s

2 = 0, this writes:
n1 bT1 + n2T 2 = bz1 + z2 :
But this means that the allocation (bz1; bT1; z2 ; T 2 ) 2 B(n1; n2; w1; w2) is Pareto superior to
(z1 ; T

1 ; z

2 ; T

2 ), a contradiction.
This lemma says that any Pareto-e¢ cient allocation of public goods and tax burdens in a
two-jurisdiction federation ignoring the incentive compatibility constraints can be thought
of as resulting from a two-step procedure: a rst step in which a federal government selects a
pair of per capita net equalization subsidies s1 and s2 (one such subsidy for every jurisdiction,
with aggregate subsidies summing to 0) and a second step in which each household allocates
its wealth increased by the subsidy received between public and private good expenditures
assuming that it faces a (Lindahl) price of the public good given by the inverse of the
population size of its jurisdiction of residence.
An e¢ cient federal provision of public goods and tax burdens in this sense (that satises
the incentive constraints (6)) is depicted on Figure 3.
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zT
T1
z1
T2
z2
Figure 3: An e¢ cient federal allocation that satises the incentive contraints.
A second possibility for the solution of program (4) is that at least one of the incentive
constraints (6)) binds. As it turns out, the handling of these constraints is somewhat fa-
cilitated by a proper understanding of the properties of the optimal subsidies of Lemma 2.
As shown in Gravel and Poitevin (2006), it is possible that these subsidies chosen by a wel-
farist social planner be regressive in the sense of being increasing with respect to household
wealth. That is, in the two-jurisdiction case, it is possible that the social planner chooses
the subsidies in such a way that poor households transfer scal revenues to rich households.
This regressivity may arise if the objective function of the social planner is not additively
separable between individual wealth and the price of public good. If this objective func-
tion results from composition of an additively separable Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function with an individual indirect utility function, then a necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition for avoiding this possible regressivity is for the indirect utility function to be itself
additively separable between the price of the public good and the wealth of the household.
In Gravel and Poitevin (2006), it was further shown that if the individual indirect utility
function results from an additively separable individual direct utility functions, it can be
additively separable between the price of the public good and the wealth if and only if the
direct utility function is either quasi-linear or logarithmic with respect to the public good.
As mentioned above, quasi-linear utility makes the problem studied in this paper trivial.
Yet most equalization payments of federations that we are aware of are progressive. If we
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want to limit our attention to additively separable utility functions while being sure that the
subsidies chosen by the social planner be progressive, we are then forced to assume that the
additively separable function is in fact logarithmic with respect to the public good. Beside
its empirical plausibility, considering (optimally chosen) progressive per capita subsidies in
federations with immobile households also simplies the handling of incentive compatibility
constraints in the study of the optimal jurisdiction structure. For it can be seen that, in the
two-type case, if a pair of packages of local public goods and taxes that is Pareto e¢ cient
in the federation for a progressive subsidies scheme violates the incentive constraint of the
poor, then the centralized jurisdiction structure Pareto dominates the federal one. We state
this fact formally as follows.
Lemma 3 Let B(n1; n2; w1; w2) = f(z1; T1; z2; T2) 2 R4 : n1T1 + n2T2  z1 + z2 and Ti  wi
for i = 1; 2g and let (z1 ; T 1 ; z2 ; T 2 ) be e¢ cient in B(n1; n2; w1; w2) with respect to a scheme
of subsidies s1 and s2 as per Lemma 2 satisfying s1 < 0 < s2. Then, if U(z2 ; w2   T 2 ) 
U(z1 ; w2 T 1 ) (incentive compatibility constraint of the poor is binding or violated), 	(N) >
	(N1; N2):
Proof. Assume that (z1 ; T

1 ; z

2 ; T

2 ) is e¢ cient in B(n1; n2; w1; w2) with respect to a
scheme of subsidies s1 and s2 as per Lemma 2 satisfying s1 < 0 < s2, and is such that:
(11) U(z2 ; w2   T 2 )  U(z1 ; w2   T 1 ):
Because the per capita subsidies s1 and s2 that support this Pareto-e¢ cient federal provision
of public good as per Lemma 2 are progressive, s1 = z1=n1   T 1 < 0 so that T 1 > 0
(since z1 > 0). Consider then merging jurisdictions 1 and 2 and providing every one with
z1 unit of public good while asking a tax payment of T

1 . If it was feasible, such a centralized
provision of the public good would weakly Pareto dominate the federal provision associated
with (z1 ; T

1 ; z

2 ; T

2 ) because type 1 individual would be indi¤erent and, because of inequality
(11), type 2 households would be weakly better o¤. Let us show that the centralized provision
(z1 ; T

1 ) is feasible. This amount to showing that:
(n1 + n2)T

1  z1 :
Since (z1 ; T

1 ; z

2 ; T

2 ) is feasible and e¢ cient in B(n1; n2; w1; w2), one has:
n1T

1 + n2T

2 = z

1 + z

2
()
n1T

1 + n2T

2   z2 = z1
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which implies, given that n2T 2   z2 = n2s2 > 0, that n1T 1 > z1 and, therefore, that (n1 +
n2)T

1 > z

1 (since T

1 > 0). Because this inequality is strict, it is actually possible to increase
public good provision for all without increasing taxes, that is, it is possible to increase the
utility level of all.
Simple as it is, this lemma facilitates the analysis of the two-type case by restricting
attention, in the study of the optimal federal provision of public good, to the incentive
compatibility constraint of type-1 households. Of course, the progressivity of the equalization
subsidies that supports an e¢ cient federal provision of public goods as per Lemma 2 is crucial
for Lemma 3. Yet, if we take this progressivity as granted, the only relevant possibility other
than that when no IC is binding when analyzing program (4) in the two-type case is to solve:
max
z1;T1;z2;T2
n1U(z1; w1   T1) + n2U(z2; w2   T2)(12)
s.t. z1 + z2  n1T1 + n2T2
U(z1; w1   T1)  U(z2; w1   T2):
Two general remarks can be made about this program. A rst one is that its solution entails
the well-known no distortion at the top" property that the bundle of public and private
goods consumed by a rich household in a federal system where its incentive constraint is
binding is the bundle it would like to consume in such a federal system without incentive
constraint if it was facing a price of public good of 1=n1 and had a wealth of w1  s for some
per capita subsidy s transferred to the poor jurisdiction. A formal way to write this (the
proof of which is left to the reader) is as follows.
Lemma 4 Let U be a utility function in U . Then (bz1; bT1; bz2; bT2) is the solution of program
(12) if and only if bz1 = zM(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) and bT1 = w1   xM(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) for the per
capita subsidy bs that solves, along with (bz2; bT2), the program:
max
s;T2;z2
n1V (1=n1; 1; w1   s) + n2U(z2; w2   T2)(13)
s.t. n1s+ n2T2  z2
V (1=n1; 1; w1   s)  U(z2; w1   T2):
The second remark concerns the relation between the per capita subsidy given by rich
households to poor ones when the incentive constraint of the rich household binds (Lemma
4) and the subsidy when this incentive constraint does not bind (Lemma 2). As shown in the
following lemma, the per capita subsidy given by the rich jurisdiction to the poor one will
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always be smaller when the incentive constraint binds than when the incentive constraint
does not bind. As in the Mirrleesian optimal taxation literature, giving incentives to the
rich to stay in their jurisdiction somewhat mitigates the equalizing propensity of the social
planner as compared to what it would do if the incentives of the rich were not constraining.
Lemma 5 Let U be a utility function in U and s be the solution of the program:
(14) max
s
n1V (1=n1; 1; w1   s) + n2V (1=n2; 1; w2 + n1s=n2).
Let (bs; bz2; bT2) be the solution of program (13). Then bs  s and bz2  zM2 (1=n2; 1; w2 +
n1s
=n2).
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. First, we show that:
VR(1=n1; 1; w1   s) > @U(~z2; w2  
~T2)
@x
;
where (~z2; ~T2) denote the solution of program (13) when the subsidy s is constrained to take
the value s. We then show that, at the solution of program (13), we must have
VR(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) < @U(bz2; w2   bT2)
@x
:
Finally, we show that in order to obtain this latter inequality, it must be the case that bs  s.
It is then easy to show that bz2  zM2 (1=n2; 1; w2 + n1s=n2).
We know that the solution of program (14), s, is such that:
VR(1=n1; 1; w1   s) = VR(1=n2; 1; w2 + n1s=n2);
(s equalizes the marginal utility of income across households). Suppose that we x s and
that we solve program (13) by choosing z2 and T2 given s. The allocation of the rich household
does not change since the subsidy s does not change. The allocation of the poor household
is now implicitly characterized by the two constraints of program (13) that will be binding at
the solution of the program (the proof of this is left to the reader):
n1s
 + n2 ~T2 = ~z2
V (1=n1; 1; w1   s) = U(~z2; w1   ~T2):
20
In general, there are two allocations that simultaneously satisfy these two equations. However,
only one also satises the (unwritten) incentive constraint for the poor household. At this
allocation, we have that:
~z2 < z
M
2 (1=n2; 1; w2 + n1s
=n2)
and that:
~T2 < T
M
2 =
zM2 (1=n2; 1; w2 + n1s
=n2)  n1s
n2
:
Moreover, we know that:
VR(1=n2; 1; w2 + n1s
=n2) =
@U(z2 ; w2   T 2 )
@x
:
Let us now show that:
@U(z2 ; w2   T 2 )
@x
>
@U(~z2; w2   ~T2)
@x
;
that is, let us show that the marginal utility of income of the poor household decreases when
we move from the allocation (z2 ; T

2 ) to the allocation (~z2; ~T2).
We rst note that we have
n1s
 + n2T 2 = z

2
n1s
 + n2 ~T2 = ~z2;
that is, both allocations are on the same budget line" for the poor household. Let Ux(n1s+
n2T2; w2 T2) be the partial derivative of U with respect to its second argument. Notice that,
since Uxz  0 by super-modularity, one has:
(15)
@Ux(n1s
 + n2T2; w2   T2)
@T2
= n2Uxz   Uxx > 0:
Notice also that, as we move from (z2 ; T

2 ) to (~z2; ~T2) along the budget line, T2 decreases.
Combined with inequality (15), this implies that Ux decreases as well along the budget line.
Hence, one has:
VR(1=n1; 1; w1   s) > @U(~z2; w2  
~T2)
@x
:
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We now show that, at the solution of program (13), we have:
VR(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) < @U(bz2; w2   bT2)
@x
:
We do this by writing down the the rst-order conditions of program (13):
T2 :  n2Ux(bz2; w2   bT2) +   n2 +   Ux(bz2; w1   bT2) = 0
z2 : n2Uz(bz2; w2   bT2)      Uz(bz2; w1   bT2) = 0
s :  n1VR(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) + n1      VR(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) = 0
where  and  are the multipliers of the two constraints. Substituting for the value of  drawn
from the rst condition into the third one yields (after some straightforward manipulations):
n1(Ux(bz2; w2  bT2) VR(1=n1; 1; w1 bs)) n1
n2
Ux(bz2; w1   bT2) + VR(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) = 0:
This can only hold if the rst term is positive. Hence,
VR(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) < @U(bz2; w2   bT2)
@x
:
Since the above inequality is reversed at s, the nal step of the proof requires showing
that s must decrease for this inequality to be satised. Consider rst the e¤ect of s on
VR(1=n1; 1; w1 s). A standard comparative statics exercise shows that, if U is concave, then
V is concave in income. This implies that VRs(1=n1; 1; w1   s) > 0: Hence, if s decreases,
the marginal utility of income of the rich household decreases.
Consider now the e¤ect of s on Ux(z2; w2 T2) where (z2; T2) are the solution of program
(13) for a given s. We know that (z2; T2) is at the intersection of the two constraints of
program (13). Inserting the budget constraint into the incentive constraint yields
(16) V (1=n1; 1; w1   s)  U(n1s+ n2T2; w1   T2) = 0:
This implicitly denes T2 as a function of s. We want to evaluate the e¤ect of s on Ux(n1s+
n2T2; w2   T2) when T2 is characterized by the condition (16). We have
(17)
dUx(n1s+ n2T2; w2   T2)
ds
= Uxz

n1 + n2
dT2
ds

  UxxdT2
ds
;
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where
dT2
ds
=   VR   n1U
1
z
 n2U1z + U1x
< 0
is calculated along condition (16) and U1 = U(n1s + n2T2; w1   T2) (as opposed to U =
U(n1s + n2T2; w2   T2)). It is easy to show that the denominator of dT2=ds is negative
because of the single-crossing property and the fact that constraint (16) is binding. If it was
positive, then the solution would not be optimal since it would be possible to increase the
utility of the poor household without decreasing that of the rich household while satisfying all
constraints. This implies that dT2=ds < 0.
We now evaluate the sign of the coe¢ cient of Uxz in (17).
n1 + n2
dT2
ds

=
 n1n2U1z + n1U1x + n2VR + n2n1U1z
 n2U1z + U1x
=
n1U
1
x + n2VR
 n2U1z + U1x
< 0:
These sign calculations imply that dUx=ds < 0 in equation (17). Hence, if s decreases, the
marginal utility of income of the poor household increases.
We have shown that, at s, the marginal utility of the rich household is higher than that
of the poor. We have also shown that it must be lower at the optimal separating allocation.
To lower the marginal utility of the rich and increase that of the poor (to reach the optimal
separating allocation), we have to decrease s (starting form s). Hence, it must be the case
that bs  s.
It is easy to show that bz2  zM2 (1=n2; 1; w2 + n1s=n2). Since the public good is normal,
one must have zM2 (1=n2; 1; w2 + n1bs=n2)  zM2 (1=n2; 1; w2 + n1s=n2). Hence, handling the
incentive constraints of the rich households impose a distortion on the consumption of public
good of the poor that is that bz2  zM2 (1=n2; 1; w2 + n1bs=n2).
The reason for the fact that the subsidy from the rich to the poor in a federation is smaller
when the incentive constraint binds than when it does not is clear. When the incentive
constraint does not bind, the subsidy serves to some extent the purpose of equalizing the
marginal utility of income of both types of households. It acts therefore as a redistributing
device. When the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, the central planner must
cool down its redistributive propensity and must leave rich households with a higher income
and a lower marginal utility of income than that of the poor. This is achieved with a lower
subsidy. Note that the cost of redistribution is in terms of distortion to the amount of public
good consumed by the poor household. If the two goods are normal, this means that the
rich household will consume more of the public good when the constraint is binding than
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when it is not. We can show that the rich household will increase its tax bill slightly so that
the increase in income due to the decrease in subsidy will be shared between the two goods.
As for the poor household, it will consume less of the public good. In general, it is not
possible to determine whether the taxes on the poor household are larger or smaller when
the incentive constraint binds as compared to the situation where it does not bind. On the
one hand, less resources are needed since less public good is provided. On the other hand,
the subsidy from the rich households is smaller so that more taxes may need to be raised.
3.2 The two-type case with logarithmic utility functions
In what follows, we compare the federal and the centralized provisions of the public good
with private information in the two-type case from the view point of a utilitarian social
planner when the households utility function writes:
(18) U(z; x) = ln z + lnx:
This case, which assumes a logarithmic form also with respect to the private good, and which
treats the two goods symmetrically, is (much) more specic than the mere assumption that
utility be logarithmic with respect to the public good that is required by the assumption
that the subsidy from the rich household to the poor household in a federal system without
the incentive constraint be progressive (see Gravel and Poitevin (2006)). Yet, it is tractable
and provides a representative example of the kinds of situations that are covered when
the households utility is additively separable and when the social planner wishes to solve
program (4) without the IC constraints by choosing a progressive subsidy scheme. Another
advantage of this specication is that, for the most part, it makes the choice between a federal
and centralized structure depending upon only two parameters: the ratio of the high wealth
over the small one (the interquartile) and the ratio of the number of rich over the number
of poor (demographic ratio). As will be seen, this two-dimensional representation is quite
useful for identifying the set of parameters that determine the social planners preference
for the federal structure over the centralized one. Among other things, it enables a nice
two-dimensional geometric depiction of the situation.
We start by nding the provision of public good and tax that the planner would choose in
the centralized jurisdiction structure as per program (7). The rst order condition of program
(7) writes:
n1Uz(z
sb1; w1 T sb1)+n2Uz(zsb1; w2 T sb1) = n1Uc(z
sb1; w1   T sb1) + n2Uc(zsb1; w2   T sb1)
n
:
Applying this to the logarithmic utility function dened by (18) yields (after lengthy manip-
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ulations, done with the precious help of Mathematica):4
zsb1 =
n1w1 + n2w2 + 2n1w2 + 2n2w1   g(n1; n2; w1; w2)
4
;
T sb1 =
zsb1
(n1 + n2)
;
where:
g(n1; n2; w1; w2) = ( 8(n1 + n2)2w1w2 + (n2(2w1 + w2) + n1(w1 + 2w2))2)1=2;
and where the superscript sb1 refers to the 1-jurisdiction second-best allocation.
We now consider the optimal allocation of public good and taxes that the utilitarian
social planner would choose in the federal system in which the two types of households are
separated into two distinct jurisdictions. Again, this amounts to analyzing program (4) for
the specic logarithmic utility function of equation (18).
As discussed above, we start this analysis by rst considering the case where the two
incentive constraints are satised and where the social planner solves:
(19) max
z1;T1;z2;T2
n1[ln z1 + ln(w1   T1)] + n2[ln z2 + ln(w2   T2)] s.t. z1 + z2  n1T1 + n2T2:
It is not di¢ cult to show that the solution of program (19) is:
zfb21 =
n1(n1w1 + n2w2)
2(n1 + n2)
;
zfb22 =
n2(n1w1 + n2w2)
2(n1 + n2)
;
T fb21 =
n1w1   n2w2 + 2n2w1
2(n1 + n2)
;
T fb22 =
n2w2   n1w1 + 2n1w2
2(n1 + n2)
;
where the superscript fb2 refers to the 2-jurisdiction f irst-best allocation in which incentive
constraints are ignored. Notice that this solution implies that private good consumption
equal to the Marshallian demand for the private good (Lemma 2)  is equalized across
jurisdictions because the households wealth (net of the subsidy received) is equalized across
jurisdictions and, thanks to the (Cobb-Douglas) structure of the householdspreferences,
Marshallian demands for the private good do not depend upon the price of the public good.
Notice that the equalization of wealth achieved here results from the fact that the indirect
4All computations performed on Mathematica are available upon request.
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utility function is additively separable in the wealth and the price of the public good. How-
ever, the quantity of the public good consumed in the two jurisdictions di¤ers because the
population size (equal to the inverse of the price of the public good) di¤ers. Note that the
level of public good in one jurisdiction is increasing in that jurisdictions population and
decreasing in the other jurisdictions population.
We can compute the (aggregate) subsidy as per Lemma 2 which, given the progressivity
associated with these preferences, comes from the rich (type 1) to the poor (type 2). This
subsidy, denoted sfb2, is nothing else than the di¤erence between tax revenues and public
good expenditure in the rich jurisdiction:
(20) sfb2  n1T fb21   zfb21 =
n1n2(w1   w2)
n1 + n2
:
The subsidy is (thanks to progressivity) monotonically increasing with respect to the wealth
di¤erence between the two types of households. The subsidy is also increasing with respect to
the population size of each jurisdiction. When population increases in one jurisdiction, the
demand for public good provision increases. For the assumed utility function, the increase in
public good is exactly nanced by the increase in population so that aggregate taxes do not
have to increase. When n2 increases, the per capita subsidy to the poor decreases so that
the marginal utility of income for the poor increases. To restore the equality of marginal
utility of income across jurisdictions, the subsidy has to increase. When n1 increases, the per
capita subsidy from the rich decreases so that their marginal utility of income has increased.
The subsidy then has to increase for optimal redistribution.
We now consider the incentive compatibility constraints. Since we do not need to worry
about the incentive constraint of the poor type in so far as the comparison of the federal and
the centralized provision of the public good is concerned thanks to Lemma 3, we restrict our
attention to the program:
max
z1;T1;z2;T2
n1[ln(w1   T1) + ln z1] + n2[ln(w2   T2) + ln(z2)]
s.t.
2X
j=1
zj 
2X
j=1
njTj(21)
ln(w1   T1) + ln z1  ln(w1   T2) + ln z2:
If the incentive constraint of the rich does not bind at the solution of program (21), then
the solution of this program is precisely that of program (19) above. Hence, we start by
evaluating the incentive constraint of the rich at the solution of program (19). We can show
(again with the help of Mathematica) that:
ln(w1   T fb21 ) + ln zfb21  ln(w1   T fb22 ) + ln zfb22
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is equivalent to:
(22)
n21w1 + n
2
2(w2   2w1) + 3n1n2(w2   w1)
n2(3n1w1 + 2n2w1   2n1w2   n2w2)  0:
Since the denominator is positive, only the numerator matters for the sign of the expression.
Fortunately, as mentioned above, it is possible to restrict the number of parameters by
replacing n1 by a  n2 and w1 by b  w2 where:
a = n1=n2
is the demographic ratio (of the number of rich over the number of poor) and
b = w1=w2
is the interquartile ratio (the ratio of the highest income over the smallest income in this
two-type world). By assumption a > 0 and b > 1. Condition (22) can then be rewritten as:
n22w2(1  3a(b  1)  2b+ a2b)  0;
or, equivalently,
(23) IC1(a; b)  a2b  3(b  1)a+ 1  2b  0:
When inequality (23) holds, the incentive constraint for the rich household is satised at
the fb2 allocation. While, thanks to Lemma 3, this is not needed for the comparison of the
federal and the centralized structure, we can also write down the inequality that corresponds
to the incentive constraint of the poor. This inequality can be shown to be equivalent to:
(24) IC2(a; b)  a2(b  2) + 3(b  1)a+ 1  0:
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of these two incentive constraints in the (a; b)-
space.
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Figure 4: Incentive constraints in the (a; b) space.
As can be seen, the curves IC1 and IC2 intersect at a = b = 1, which is to be expected.
When b = 1, all households have the same income. Hence, if they live in two separated
jurisdictions, they will only di¤er by their consumption of the public good, which depends on
the population of their jurisdiction. When a = 1, both jurisdictions have the same population,
hence the same consumption of the public good. Both incentive constraints are therefore
satised at this point.
For all values of a < 1, the incentive constraint of the rich household is violated at the
solution of program (19). That is, rich households always have an incentive to move from
their jurisdiction and to go to that of the poor when there are more poor than rich. Indeed,
when the number of rich is lower than that of the poor, the rich face a larger price of public
good and, as a result, consume less public good than the poor. Since the poor also pay less
tax than the rich, the rich then have incentive to join the poor jurisdiction. In the realistic
case where the number of rich is smaller than that of the poor, the social planner will face
a binding incentive constraint of the rich if it chooses a federal structure.
We can now compare the centralized and the federal jurisdiction structures allowing, in
the later case, for the incentive constraint to bind or not.
The rst comparison we make is between the centralized and the federal structures when
the incentive constraint of the rich is satised at allocation fb2.
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The social welfare at the second-best allocation with one jurisdiction is:
(25) SW sb1 = n1U(zsb1; w1   T sb1) + n2U(zsb1; w2   T sb1):
while the social welfare at the two-jurisdiction federal allocation without incentive constraints
is:
(26) SW fb2 = n1U(z
fb2
1 ; w1   T fb21 ) + n2U(zfb22 ; w2   T fb22 ):
After some manipulations (again performed by Mathematica), we can show that:
SW fb2   SW sb1 / 41+aaa(1 + ab)2+2a   (1 + a)1+a (1 + 2b+ a(2 + b)  h(a; b))1+a
(3 + 2a  2b  ab+ h(a; b)) ( 1  2a+ 2b+ 3ab+ h(a; b))a
where a = n1=n2, b = w1=w2, and:
h(a; b) =
p
 8(1 + a)2b+ (1 + 2b+ a(2 + b))2:
The sign of SW fb2 SW sb1 is the same as the sign of the expression on the right-hand side.
This is quite a messy expression, but it does depend only upon the demographic and the
interquartile ratios. This expression is plotted (in red color) on the (a; b)-space on Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Distributional parameters that determine the choice of the optimal jurisdiction
structure.
Over the region where both incentive constraints (in blue and in green as in Figure 4) are
satised that is, when the allocation fb2 is the solution to the second-best problem the set
of combinations of values for the parameters (a; b) that lie above the red curve are those for
which the utilitarian social planner prefers the federal structure to the centralized one. As can
be seen, this preference arises when income disparities, as measured by the interquartile ratio
w1=w2, are relatively large (so that there there is a strong motive for income redistribution
and adjustment of the private and public good provision to the heterogeneity of households
willingness to pay for the public good). Analogously, the larger is the number of rich (relative
to the number of poor), the more likely it is that the federal solution be favored by the
utilitarian planner. In addition, Figure 5 illustrates the result of Lemma 3 since the red
curve on the North East of which the federal solution dominates the centralized one never
intercepts the boundary of the zone where the incentive constraint of the poor (in blue) is
violated.
Figure 5 also uses the Pareto criterion to compare the two structures. The area above
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the black curve indicates indeed the set of parameters values for which the federal structure
chosen by the utilitarian social planner is unanimously preferred to the centralized solution
chosen by this very same social planner. The area above the black curve is simply the set of
all parameter value for which:
U(zsb1; w1   T sb1)  U(zfb21 ; w1   T fb21 )
U(zsb1; w2   T sb1)  U(zfb22 ; w2   T fb22 );
so that both types of households prefer the fb2 allocation to the sb1 for all parameter values.
Unfortunately, the two-dimensional feature of the analysis in (a; b)-space is lost when the
incentive constraint of the rich is binding at the solution of program (21). For we cannot
plot a frontier at the north-west" of the IC1 curve in Figure 5 that separates the set
of combinations of demographic and interquartile ratios for which a federal jurisdiction is
preferable to a centralized one from a social welfare view point. In this case, the choice
between the two structures depends upon the four parameters (n1; n2; w1; w2), and not only
upon the ratios a = n1=n2 and b = w1=w2.
We can nonetheless state results about the set of values of the parameters that would lead
the utilitarian social planner to favor the federal system over the centralized one. The key to
this part of the analysis is the study of the subsidy given by the rich to the poor mentioned
in Lemma 4. As shown in Lemma 5, this subsidy is smaller when the IC constraint of the
rich is binding at the optimal allocation in a federal structure than when it is not binding.
As it turns out, it is even possible for this subsidy be negative when the IC constraint of the
rich is binding.
Indeed, consider xing s in the program (21) and, for such a subsidy, solving the program
for z2 and T2 using the two constraints. Denote this partial solution z2(s) and T2(s). Now,
the optimal subsidy bs solves:
(27) max
s
n1V (1=n1; 1; w1   s) + n2U(z2(s); w2   T2(s)):
and satises therefore the rst order condition:
 n1VR(1=n1; 1; w1   bs) + n2 1
z2(s)
dz2(bs)
ds
  1
w2   T2(s)
dT2(bs)
ds

= 0:
There are values of (w1; w2; n1; n2) for which this condition is solved for bs = 0. It is not
di¢ cult (thanks to Mathematica) to see that the set of parameters for which this happens
depends only upon a and b. This set is in fact described by the equality:
(28) b =
 p1  a  2a
 2a+ ap1  a:
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On Figure 5, we have plotted (in yellow) the curve described by equation (28). It is easy to
see that b goes to innity when a becomes negligible. For all values of a and b to the left
(right) of this line, the optimal subsidy is negative (positive). When a is very small, there
are very few rich households. Furthermore, when a is small, the implicit price for the public
good for the rich is very large relative to that for the poor. Hence, the amount of public
good provided for the rich is small. This implies that the optimal subsidy from the rich to
the poor must be negative in order to prevent the rich from moving to the poor jurisdiction.
As it turns out, if the optimal subsidy chosen by the utilitarian social planner for the
federal solution is 0, then it is always better to choose the centralized provision. We state
this formally as follows.
Lemma 6 Suppose the solution to program (27) is bs = 0. Then the utilitarian social planner
prefers the centralized jurisdiction structure to the federal one.
Proof. Assume that
b =
 p1  a  2a
 2a+ ap1  a:
Call the solution to program (21) SW sb2.
SW sb2 = n1U(bz1; w1   bT1) + n2U(bz2; w2   bT2);
where bz1 = n1w1=2, bT1 = w1=2, bz2 = z2(0), bT2 = T2(0): When we replace w1 by bw2 and n1
by an2, we can show that
SW sb2
n2
=  a log[4an2] + 2a log

 (2a+
p
1 a)p
1 a 2 n2w2

+ log

 1+p1 a a
2a(
p
1 a 2)w2

+
log

 ( 3+3
p
1 a+a)(2a+
p
1 a)
2a(
p
1 a 2)2
n2w2

and that
SW sb1
n2
= a log
q
 a3 2(
p
1 a 1)a2+(2
p
1 a 1)a+1+a
p
1 a+a+p1 a

w2
2a(2 
p
1 a)

+
log
q
 a3 2(
p
1 a 1)a2+(2
p
1 a 1)a+1 a
p
1 a+a p1 a

w2
2a(2 
p
1 a)

+
(a+ 1) log

 (a+1)
q
 a3 2(
p
1 a 1)a2+(2
p
1 a 1)a+1+a
p
1 a 3a p1 a

n2w2
2a(2 
p
1 a)

:
Using Mathematica, we compute the di¤erence SW sb2=n2 SW sb1=n2. We can show that
the resulting expression is independent of w2 and n2. We then set without loss of generality
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w2 = n2 = 1. This implies that the di¤erence in welfare only depends on the ratio a. We can
plot it over the interval a 2 ]0; 1]. The graph demonstrates that the expression is negative over
this domain of a. Consequently, the one-jurisdiction structure yields higher social welfare
than the two-jurisdiction structure does.
When the optimal subsidy is zero in the two-jurisdiction structure, there is no redistrib-
ution from the rich to the poor. Furthermore, there is duplication in the production of the
public good. It is then socially optimal to have only one jurisdiction. The preference for a
federal jurisdiction structure over a centralized one can only appear when it is optimal for
the central planner in a federal structure to redistribute tax revenue across jurisdictions.
The optimal subsidy can also be examined along the IC1 curve, where the incentive
constraint of the rich is weakly binding. Along this curve, the allocation sb2 coincides with
the allocation fb2. The optimal subsidy is then bs = sfb2. As illustrated in Figure 5, there
exists a point on the curve above which the two-jurisdiction structure socially dominates the
one-jurisdiction structure. This occurs for a value of b that is su¢ ciently large.
From these two observations, one concludes that the region of social indi¤erence between
the federal and the centralized structures is located somewhere between the line for whichbs = 0 and that for IC1. This suggests that for any given demographic ratio a however small,
there exists a high enough interquartile ratio b above which the social planner will always
favour a federal structure over a centralized one. Unfortunately, Figure 5 does not provide us
with any clue about whether or not this intuition is correct because what happens between
the IC1 curve and the yellow curve does not depend only upon the ratios a and b. It depends
upon the four parameters (w1; w2; n1; n2). However, as shown in the following lemma, we can
prove indirectly that this intuition is correct.
Lemma 7 For any demographic ratio a such that the constraint IC1 is binding, there exists
a value for the interquartile ratio b at which the utilitarian social planner prefers the two-
jurisdiction structure.
Proof. One needs to compute the di¤erence SW sb2  SW sb1. The di¢ culty lies in char-
acterizing the optimal level of subsidy bs in the allocation sb2 where the IC1 constraints binds.
Instead of doing so, we compute this di¤erence using the subsidy sfb2. Since this subsidy is
suboptimal when IC1 is binds, this computation underestimates the di¤erence SW sb2 SW sb1.
Using Mathematica, we get
SW sb2f =n2   SW sb1=n2 = 2a log
h
an2w2(ab+1)
a+1
i
  a log[4an2]+
log

n2w2
p
a3( b2)+a2(4b2 6b+1)+a(4b2 2b 1)+b2+a b+2
p
a3( b2)+a2(4b2 6b+1)+a(4b2 2b 1)+b2 2ab+a b

(a+1)

 
p
(a(b+2)+2b+1)2 8b(a+1)2+ab 2a+2b 3


 
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(a+ 1) log
h
1
4
n2w2

 p(a(b+ 2) + 2b+ 1)2   8b(a+ 1)2 + ab+ 2a+ 2b+ 1i 
a log

w2
p
(a(b+2)+2b+1)2 8b(a+1)2+3ab 2a+2b 1

4(a+1)

where SW sb2f refers to the second-best social welfare with the suboptimal subsidy s
fb2. We
can show that the sign of this expression only depends on the ratios a and b, that is, it is
independent of n2 and w2. We then x the ratio a and take the limit of SW sb2f  SW sb1 when
b goes to innity. We can show that this di¤erence converges to innity. This implies that,
for any demographic ratio a, there exists a high enough interquartile ratio b such that the
two-jurisdiction structure is socially preferable.
4 Conclusion
The conclusion of this paper holds in one sentence that can be stated, after Wallace Oates
(1972)s quotation recalled above, as follows. Even when the "cost-savings from the central-
ized provision of a public good" is maximal, the level of (utilitarian) welfare may be at least
as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-e¢ cient levels of consumption are provided in each
jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained." In the model
considered in this paper, we have indeed considered the most extreme form of cost-savings
from a centralized provision of a public good" that one can imagine: that of a non-rival
public good with no congestion. We have shown in such a setting that if the public authority
is imperfectly informed about the willingness to pay of its citizens, it may nd optimal to
organize the provision of the public good into several distinct jurisdictions rather than in
a single one, even at the high cost of provision that results from the replication in several
jurisdictions of the cost of providing the very same non-rival public good. The reason for
this preference comes from the information that the social planner obtains from having indi-
viduals choosing" their jurisdiction of residence and, therefore, expressing their preferences
for their favorite tax and public good packages. In a single uniform level of consumption"
centralized jurisdiction structure, individuals must all pay the same taxes and consume the
same amount of public good because under private information, the public authority is in-
capable to individualize those. In a federal structure, the central government may achieve
a better targeting of the packages to the tastes of its citizens. Our analysis shows that the
benet of this better targeting may outweigh the cost of unnecessarily replicating the pro-
vision of a non-rival public good into several jurisdictions. We have shown more specically
that the superiority of a federal provision of a public good over a centralized one is all the
more likely as the heterogeneity in the population is large. Using the somewhat specic case
of a two-type population of unequally wealthy households, we have shown in particular that
federal provision tends to dominate the centralized one when the wealth di¤erences between
the rich and the poor is large, and when the ratio of the rich over the poor is also large. As
the fraction of rich people in the population becomes small, the case in favor of a federal
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solution vanishes even though, for any fraction of rich in the population however how small,
it is always possible to nd a su¢ ciently large wealth discrepancy between the rich and the
poor that would make federal provision preferable to the centralized one.
While we believe this analysis, and the strong case that it makes in favor of a federal
provision of public good, to be of some interest, we are aware of many of its limitations.
For one thing, we have limited our attention to households who di¤er only in contributive
capacities (wealth), and who have the same preferences for the private and the public good.
An alternative would have been to consider the case of households with the same wealth,
but with di¤erent tastes for the public good. We conjecture that one would obtain very
similar conclusions to the one obtained here in this case. A more realistic, but analytically
much more challenging, situation would have been that where households di¤er both in their
wealth and their preferences.
Another obvious limitation is the restriction of a large part of our analysis to a two-type
setting. Yet the di¢ culty of the problem of the optimal choice of a jurisdiction structure
under private information was already signicant. Imagine for instance a three-type setting.
Then, one would need to consider a large number of possibilities: a centralized solution with
all householdstypes pooled into a unique jurisdiction, a completely decentralized" setting
where each type forms a jurisdiction on its own, and two mixed federal" structures (one
where the rich are pooled with the middle" in one jurisdiction and the poor are left alone
and the other where the rich stay alone and the middle" and the poor form a jurisdiction).
Thanks to the single crossing property, these are the only jurisdiction structures that would
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. But the analysis of all of these cases, with
all the varying possibilities for the incentive constraints to bind or not, would have taken
us somewhat too far for a rst pass on the subject. But we plan to explore more fully this
k-type problem in our future work.
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